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CLOSING THE REGULATORY GAP IN MICHIGAN'S PUBLIC
TRUST DOCTRINE: SAVING MICHIGAN MILLIONS WITH
STATUTORY REFORM
Kelsey Breck*

The Great Lakes are some of Michigan's most valuable and important environmental resources. The public trust doctrine requires Michigan to protect and preserve the lands along the shores of the Great Lakes for the use offuturegenerations.
Unfortunately, the public trust doctrine in Michigan is in disarray and as a result,
public and private rights to the lands along the Great Lakes are poorly delineated.
This Note presents an economic argumentfor why the public trust doctrine should
be reformed to better define public and private rights to the land along Michigan's
Great Lakes. It also suggests a statutory reform that would solve many of the
problems that currently exist with Michigan's public trust doctrine. Without the
statutory reform proposed in this Note, or something similar,Michigan stands to
lose millions of dollars in valuable environmental resources associated with the
Great Lakes.

INTRODUCTION

The American public trust doctrine provides that each state
holds the navigable waters and underlying lands within its borders
in trust for the benefit of the public, to use for purposes such as
navigation, commerce, and fishing.1 States have an affirmative obligation to protect and preserve the resources held in the public trust
for current and future generations.2 Despite this obligation, the
state of Michigan lacks authority to regulate all of the land and resources it holds in the public trust.3

*

J.D. Candidate, May 2013, University of Michigan Law School, B.A., 2010, Kalamazoo

College. I would like to thank Professor Neil Kagan for his advice and support, as well as Nani
Gilkerson, Lindsey Trainor Golden, Beth Kurtz, Pearl Pickett, Nina Ruvinsky, Irine Sorser,
and Sean Stiff for significantly improving this piece. Thanks are certainly due to Chuck
Mason for listening to me talk about this Note incessantly. Finally, special thanks to my dad,
Kevin Breck, who provided invaluable editorial suggestions on this piece and has been my
fearless editor since elementary school.
1.
See, e.g., 11.Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
2.
See, e.g., Nedtweg v. Wallace, 208 N.W. 51, 53 (Mich. 1926) ("The state may not, by
grant, surrender such public rights any more than it can abdicate the police power or other
essential power of government.").
3.

See infra Part II.A-C.
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Recent court cases in Michigan have simultaneously expanded
the scope of the public trust doctrine and narrowed the State's regulatory authority. 4 As a result, a stretch of Michigan's public trust
land along its Great Lakes is entirely unregulated. 5 The State's inability to regulate public trust lands is a problem because it creates
ill-defined property rights and uncertainty between private landowners and the public about their relative rights to use those lands
and associated resources. These ill-defined property rights encourage overuse and depletion of public trust resources by both
6
private landowners and the public.
The resource depletion associated with ill-defined rights to public trust lands is likely to have significant environmental consequences for the Great Lakes in Michigan. 7 Human activities along
the lakeshore-particularly on public trust lands-are substantial
causes of environmental damage. 8 For example, development by
private littoral landowners often causes erosion, which increases
sedimentation, alters fish populations, and affects the entire lake
ecosystem.9 In addition, water quality is affected by the solid waste
4.
Compare Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W. 2d 58, 62 (Mich. 2005) (extending the public
trust doctrine to the ordinary high-water mark) with Burleson v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 808
N.W.2d 792, 796-98 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (establishing that the scope of the State's regulatory authority is limited to the fixed datum natural ordinary high-water mark, which is more
lakeward than the ordinary high-water mark).
5.
The court in Glass v. Goeckel established the boundary of the public trust doctrine at
the ordinary high-water mark, which is the mark where "the presence and action of the water
is so continuous as to leave a distinct mark." Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 62 (quoting State v. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337, 342 (Wis. 1987)). However, in Burleson v. Department of Environmental
Quality, the court limited the State's regulatory authority to a statutorily-defined water mark,
which is uniformly more lakeward than the ordinary high-water mark in Glass v. GoeckeL See
Burleson, 808 N.W.2d at 796-98. For a depiction of the disparity between the ordinary highwater mark and the fixed datum high-water mark, see infra Figure 1.
6.
See, e.g., R. Prescott Jaunich, The Environment, the Free Market, and Property Rights: PostLucas Privatizationof the Public Trust, 15 PUB. [AND L. REv. 167, 183-84 (1994) (explaining
the effects of unsettled landowner expectations, alienability of land, and clouded title of
public trust properties);Jason ScottJohnston, The Rule of Captureand the Economic Dynamics of
NaturalResource Use and Survival Under Open Access ManagementRegimes, 35 ENvri. LJ. 855, 890
(2005) (noting that unregulated private land development essentially follows the rule of
capture).
7.

See infra Part IILC.

8.
See U.S. E-nrL. PROT. AGENCY, Conservation of BiologicalDiversity in the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem: Issues and Opportunities, http://www.epa.gov/ecopage/glbd/issues (last visited
Sept. 1, 2012).
9.
See MARIO BRAUNS, HUMAN IMPACTS ON THE STRUCTuRE AND ECOLOGICAL FUNCTION
OF LITrORAL MACROIN"VERTEBRATE COMMUNITIES IN LAKES (Dec. 22, 2008) (doctoral disserta-

tion, Humboldt University of Berlin), available at http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/
brauns-mario-2009-06-29/PDF/brauns.pdf; Paul Radomski et al., Potential Impact of Docks on
LittoralHabitats in Minnesota Lakes, 35 FISHERIES 489, 489, 494 (2010). Littoral lands are those
lands adjacent to lakes.
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disposal that accompanies private development along the Great
Lakes. 10
Widespread use of public trust lands for recreation can also have
negative environmental effects. 1' For example, overfishing has long
been a problem in the Great Lakes, 12 and recreational activities like
swimming can resuspend sediments and affect fish habitats.1 3 All of
these potential threats are more likely to occur under the current
system in Michigan because ill-defined rights to public trust lands
encourage a race between private littoral landowners and the public to gain control over unregulated public trust lands. Therefore,
any environmental damage that would normally occur will likely be
accelerated under the current regime.
To avoid the environmental damage encouraged under Michigan's current system, the law should be changed to give the State
greater regulatory authority and better define both private and
public property rights to public trust resources. Change in Michigan must come through statutory reform, because the Michigan Supreme Court has already indicated that it will not review the Court
of Appeals decision that created the existing regime.' 4 However,
any proposals that alter the traditional scope of the public trust doctrine are unlikely to succeed because of deep-rooted legislative understandings about the purpose of that doctrine. 15 Advocates
hoping to induce change would, instead, be best advised to present
the Michigan legislature with a utilitarian argument that places an
economic value on the environmental damage that is likely to occur
under the current system. 16 This Note will develop such an argument, focusing on the detrimental economic effects that Michigan
could suffer if it does not reform its public trust management
system.
10.

See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 8.

11.
Id.
12.
Impacts on Biodiversity: Population Growth, Overconsumption and Technology, QUEBEC BiODivuiSii
WEsSITE, http://redpath-museum.mcgill.ca/Qbp/3.Conservation/impacts.htm
(last visited Aug. 30, 2012) [hereinafter Impacts on Biodiversity].

13.
Radomski et al., supra note 9, at 489.
14.
The Michigan Supreme Court denied the Michigan Department of Environmental
Quality's (DEQ) request for leave to appeal the decision in Burleson v. Department of Environmental Quality, 808 N.W.2d 792 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011), in a one-sentence opinion, Burleson v.
Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 805 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. 2011), evincing the court's unwillingness to
reconsider this issue.
15.
SeeJ.B. Ruhl &James Salzman, Ecosystem Services and the Public Trust Doctrine: Working
Changefrom Within, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENvrL. LJ. 223, 226-30 (2007) (discussing unsuccessful previous attempts to expand the public trust doctrine and proposing an alternative solution that focuses on the traditional underpinnings of the doctrine).
16.

See id. at 230.
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Part I of this Note provides an overview of the history of the public trust doctrine and explains the importance of using economic
arguments to convince courts and legislatures to alter the public
trust doctrine in a way that protects the environment. Part II elaborates on the problem with Michigan's public trust management system and compares it to effective systems used in other Great Lakes
states. Part III explains the environmental and economic damage
that is likely to result if the current system in Michigan is not altered to bring the State's regulatory authority in line with the scope
of the public trust doctrine. Part IV proposes a statutory reform to
Michigan's public trust management system that would enable the
State to regulate all of the land and resources held in the public
trust.

I.

THE MODERN AMERICAN PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE CAN BE AN

EFFECTIVE TOOL FOR NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

The public trust doctrine has its roots in the Roman Justinian
Code.' 7 The English later adopted the doctrine, and it eventually
became a well-accepted part of American law.' 8 Modern American
public trust doctrine recognizes the importance of navigable waters
to society and provides that a state holds the navigable waters within
its borders, as well as the lands underlying them, in trust for the
benefit of the public.' 9 In the Great Lakes states, the public trust
doctrine protects littoral lands, which are those lands adjacent to
lakes. In recent years, several court cases in the Great Lakes states
have addressed how much littoral land is protected by the public
trust doctrine in the Great Lakes states and the extent of each
state's regulatory authority over the protected land. To properly understand the nature of this debate and develop an appropriate and
effective resolution, it is important to understand the historical underpinnings of the doctrine.

17.
See generally Robert Haskell Abrams, Walking the Beach to the Core of Sovereignty: The
Historic Basis for the Public Trust Doctrine Applied in Glass v. Goeckel, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORm
861, 870-75 (2007).
18.
See generally Kenneth K. Kilbert, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Great Lakes Shores, 58
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1, 4 (2010).
19.
See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
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A. The Evolution of the Public Trust Doctrine
Under Roman law, the public trust doctrine provided that the
rivers, the sea, and the shores "[b]y the law of nature . . . [were]
common to mankind." 20 The area protected by the Roman public
trust doctrine included the navigable rivers and seas, as well as their
adjacent lands up to the "highest point reached by the water on a
predictable basis." 2' When the Romans implemented their public
trust doctrine, they balanced private and public rights to maximize
the total benefit to society without allowing private ownership to
burden the larger public interest. 22 As a result, the Romans were
able to use the public trust doctrine to glean economic and social
value from their waters.
During the nineteenth century, a series of Supreme Court decisions led to the adoption of the public trust doctrine in the United
States. 23 The American public trust doctrine differs from prior versions of the doctrine in two significant ways. First, in the United
States, numerous non-tidal but navigable lakes and rivers, including
the Great Lakes, were deemed sufficiently important to prompt the
Supreme Court to extend the public trust doctrine to non-tidal navigable waters.2 4 Second, the Supreme Court determined that states
have an affirmative duty to protect and preserve the land held in
the public trust and to only allow uses that advance the public's
25
interest with respect to that land.
In the Great Lakes region, the true lodestar in the public trust
doctrine is Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois.2 6 In that case, the Supreme Court held that, like tidal waters and the borders of the seas,
the Great Lakes were subject to the public trust doctrine and any
State ownership that followed.2 7 The Court's holding affirmed that
Illinois held the lands under Lake Michigan in trust for people of
20.
See Kilbert, supra note 18, at 4.
21.
Abrams, supra note 17, at 869.
22.
See id. at 874 (explaining how the Romans mediated between public and private
interests in, and the uses of, public trust lands).
23.
See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); 11. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. 387; Pollard v.
Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845); Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367 (1842).
24.
See infro Part II.A.
25.
See Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453 (holding that a grant by Illinois to the Illinois
Central Railroad of littoral lands along Lake Michigan was invalid because it did not fit within
the public's interest in public trust resources and "[t]he State can no more abdicate its trust
over property in which the whole people are interested ... so as to leave them entirely under
the use and control of private parties... than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace.").
26.
27.

146 U.S. 387 (1892).
See id. at 436-37.
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the state to use for purposes of navigation, commerce and fishing.28
Courts and scholars have interpreted Illinois Central Railroad to
mean that the states cannot divest themselves of their trust obliga29
tions by alienating public lands.
Following Illinois Central Railroad, the Michigan Supreme Court
acknowledged that the State of Michigan became vested with title to
the beds of all navigable waters when it joined the Union.3 0 In Nedtweg v. Wallace, the Michigan Supreme Court, applying Illinois Central
Railroad,held that the State must hold those navigable waters and
their underlying lands in trust for the public and could not, by
grant to private landowners, "surrender such public rights any more
than it [could] abdicate the police power or other essential power
of government.' 3 ' Pursuant to Illinois CentralRailroad and Nedtweg,
Michigan is obligated to take affirmative steps to protect and preserve the lands held in public trust for current and future
32
generations.

B. The Push for a More Environmentally-Conscious
Public Trust Doctrine
Despite states' affirmative obligation to protect the land and resources held in the public trust, the primary purpose of the public
trust doctrine has generally not been viewed to be environmental
protection.3 3 Instead, the public trust doctrine was historically used
to maximize the total value of waters to society. 34 Nonetheless, because of the close ties that exist between the public trust doctrine
and natural resources, some scholars have argued that the public
trust doctrine should be invoked as a tool for efficient resource
35
management.
28.

See id. at 452.

29.
See, e.g., David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property:A Cal forJudicialProtection of the Public's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARv. ENevI. L. Rev. 311, 368

(1988).
30.

See Nedtweg v. Wallace, 208 N.W. 51, 53 (Mich. 1926).

31.

Id. at 53, 54.

32.

See Nedtweg, 208 N.W. at 53; Ill. Gent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
33.
See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 15, at 228 ("[T] he chief impact of the public trust
doctrine is facilitating access to and use of tidelands and beaches. The doctrine has not been
transformed into a broadly applied judicial ecosystem protection program in any state.").
34.

See supra Part I.A.

35.

See, e.g.,Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: EffectiveJudidi-

cal Intervation, 68 MICH. L. Rlv. 471, 474 (1970).
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Prior to a 1970 article by Professor Joseph Sax, the public trust
doctrine was not seen as a tool that could be used to promote resource management. 8 Although Sax hoped that environmentalists
would be able to use the doctrine to advance their cause, -7 he did
not believe that the doctrine as it existed in 1970 could be used to
accomplish their resource management goals.38 One of the most
significant reasons for Sax's doubt of the public trust doctrine during the 1970's was the judiciary's apparent unwillingness to consider the environmental effects of a particular land use on public
trust resources.3 9 The land uses with detrimental unconsidered environmental effects included oil production and construction of
bridges, restaurants, bars, shopping complexes, airport runways,
highways, and driving ranges. 40 Sax felt that the public trust doctrine would have to undergo significant change to serve as a tool of
resource management. 4' Unfortunately, the doctrine has not
changed in the way Sax had hoped, and it seems unlikely to do so
in the future.
One of the greatest challenges to an attempt to retool the public
trust doctrine is the tendency of many courts to rely heavily on historical arguments to define the appropriate scope and content of
the doctrine. 42 In light of this historical approach, environmental
law professors J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman have suggested that it
may be more effective for environmental activists to adopt an approach that does not require a change in how the doctrine is understood. 43 According to Ruhl and Salzman, there is no need for
courts to expand or alter the public trust doctrine to use it as a tool
36.
Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 15, at 226. Sax was a well-known University of Michigan
Law School professor who conducted research regarding "citizen efforts to use the law in
environmental-quality controversies." Sax, supra note 35, at 473.
37. See id. at 474 ("Of all the concepts known to American law, only the public trust
doctrine seems to have the breadth and substantive content which might make it useful as a
tool of general application for citizens seeking to develop a comprehensive legal approach to
resource management problems.").
38. See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 15, at 556-57.
39.
40.

See id. at 564.
See id. at 226.

41.
See id.
42. See id. at 229 (quoting Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IowA L. REv. 631, 710-11
(1986)) (explaining that "[tlhe strength of the public trust doctrine necessarily lies in its
origins"); see also State ex rel.
Merrill v. Ohio Dep't of Natural Res., 955 N.E.2d 935, 949 (Ohio
2011) (indicating that its decision was not novel, but rather pursuant to longstanding precedent that reflects the history of the public trust doctrine); Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58,
64-66 (Mich. 2005) (relying heavily on the history of the public trust doctrine in its
decision).
43. See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 15, at 230.
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for achieving ecological protection. 44 Instead, those who want a
more efficient system of resource management must simply reframe
the way that ecological resources are valued. 45 Ruhl and Salzman
suggest that the best tactic is to present courts with economic arguments about the value of the resources held in the public trust.
These economic arguments will help to facilitate a traditional utilitarian analysis that results in an outcome that is beneficial to re46
source management objectives.
Ruhl and Salzman argue that courts would be more willing to
consider resource management concerns when they are placed in
an economic context. Although courts have not previously considered ecological economics in their public trust analyses, the Supreme Court has recognized that changed circumstances may
require an approach different from that ordinarily used at common
law.47 According to Ruhl and Salzman, "the growing knowledge of
the presence of natural capital" and economic value in public trust
resources is sufficiently accepted to prompt courts to consider
changes to public trust management that may better preserve that
48
economic value.
Ecological economics illuminates the valuable services that ecosystems render to the public, including flood mitigation, groundwater recharge, and carbon sequestration. 49 These economically
valuable services produce "natural capital," which provides economic benefit to littoral landowners and the public in much the
same way as do the fishing grounds and navigation channels held in
the public trust.5 0 By identifying public trust resources with high
natural capital, advocates can draw an important link between effective resource management and the traditional goal of using public
51
trust resources to maximize social welfare.
When ecological economic studies are able to appropriately
value the natural capital available in public trust resources, courts
will be justified, and perhaps more comfortable, in considering that
value when making decisions regarding public trust resources.
44.
See id.
45.
See id.
46.
See id.
47.
See id. at 235-36 (noting that increasing knowledge about the ecological economics
behind the public trust doctrine is "precisely the kind of new knowledge Lucas contemplates
the common law will use to evolve"). Cf Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031
(1992) ("Changed circumstances or new knowledge may make what was previously permissible no longer so.").
48,
See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 15, at 236.
49.
See id. at 230-31.
50.
See id. at 234.
51.
See id. at 233.
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Through such considerations, courts may find that there is more
economic value in resource preservation than in the construction
of a new highway, airport, or shopping mall. In the wake of recent
decisions regarding the public trust doctrine and Michigan's regulatory authority, environmental advocates should focus on the economic value of public trust resources as they urge courts and
legislatures to develop a regulatory scheme that effectively protects
52
and preserves public trust resources.

II.

THE PROBLEM WITH THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
IN MICHIGAN AND THE SOLUTIONS REACHED BY
OTHER GREAT LAKEs STATES

The Great Lakes states have implemented various public trust resource management systems through both case law and statute. Although each state sets the boundaries of its public trust somewhat
differently, all have instituted at least some form of permitting system to govern the use of public trust lands. The most important
distinction between the various permitting systems is whether they
provide the states with authority to regulate all the lands held in the
public trust. In those systems where the states lack comprehensive
authority, the resulting regulatory gap means that public and private users have unlimited access to unregulated resources. The regulation gap in those lands is unsustainable and inefficient because
it is likely to create resource overuse and misuse with serious environmental consequences for the Great Lakes region. 53 This section
examines the public trust management system in Michigan and
contrasts that system with the comprehensive public trust regulatory schemes of other Great Lakes states.

A. Michigan's Public Trust Management System Creates
an Inefficient Regulatory Gap
The boundaries of private ownership over the littoral lands in
Michigan are determined by the public trust doctrine and associated permitting requirements. Although the public trust doctrine
creates overlapping private and public title to the land between the
natural ordinary high-water mark and the low-water mark, 54 private
52.
53.
54.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part III.A-C.
See Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 69-70 (Mich. 2005).

276
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landowners do not have to seek permits for activities that are lakeward of the ordinary high-water mark. Instead, permits are required
only for activities that are farther lakeward, below the fixed datum
high-water mark established by the Great Lakes Submerged Lands
Act (GLSLA). 55

The Michigan Supreme Court held in Glass v. Goeckel that the
boundary of the public trust doctrine is the ordinary high- water
mark, defined as the mark where "the presence and action of the
water is so continuous as to leave a distinct mark either by erosion,
destruction of terrestrial vegetation, or other easily recognized
characteristics."' 56 In some cases, however, a littoral landowner's title
may extend past the ordinary high-water mark, thereby creating
overlapping public and private ownership interests between the
high- and low-water marks in the Great Lakes.
The GLSLA is the primary statutory mechanism by which the
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) regulates
the use of resources held in the public trust. The current language
of the GLSLA provides:
This part shall be construed so as to preserve and protect the
interests of the general public in the lands and waters described in this section, to provide for the sale, lease, exchange,
or other disposition of unpatented lands and the private or
public use of waters over patented and unpatented lands, and
to permit the filling in of patented submerged lands whenever
it is determined by the department that the private or public
use of those lands and waters will not substantially affect the
public use of those lands and waters for hunting, fishing, swimming, pleasure boating, or navigation or that the public trust
in the state will not be impaired by those agreements for use,
sales, lease, or other disposition. The word "land" or "lands" as
used in this part refers to the aforesaid described unpatented
lake bottomlands and unpatented made lands and patented
lands in the Great Lakes and the bays and harbors of the
[G]reat [L]akes lying below and lakeward of the natural ordinary
high-water mark .... For purposes of this part, the ordinary high-

55.
SeeMicui. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.32502 (West 2009); Burleson v. Dep't of Env. Quality, 808 N.W.2d 792, 796-98 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011). The statutorily-defined high-water marks
were set in 1955 and are consistently more lakeward than the natural ordinary high-water
mark. For a depiction of the space between the bounds of the public trust doctrine and the
State's regulatory authority, see infra Figure 1.
56.
Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d at 62 (quoting State v. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337, 342
(Wis. 1987)).
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water mark shall be at the following elevations above sea level, international Great Lakes datum of 1955: Lake Superior, 601.5 feet; Lakes
Michigan and Huron, 579.8 feet; Lake St. Clair, 574.7 feet; and
Lake Erie, 571.6 feet. 57
One of the most significant problems with the current statute is
that it limits the DEQ's regulatory authority to the "natural ordinary
high-water mark" without defining that term, which leaves the
boundaries of the public trust lands under the DEQ's regulatory
authority open to multiple interpretations. 58 Faced with this ambiguity, the Michigan Court of Appeals in Burleson v. Department of
Environmental Quality was called on to interpret the GLSLA to discern the boundary of the natural ordinary high-water mark and define the scope of the DEQ's regulatory authority. 59 Unfortunately,
the court's statutory interpretation has only created more confusion about the boundaries of the public trust doctrine and the
State's regulatory authority.
One factor complicating the court's analysis was the confusing
use of both "natural ordinary high-water mark" and "ordinary highwater mark" in such close proximity to one another in the statute. 60
The DEQ argued that, according to the statute, the natural ordinary high-water mark and the ordinary high-water mark are the
same, and that both are located at the boundary of the public trust
doctrine. 6 1 The court noted, however, that "the scope of [the
DEQ's] regulatory authority under the GLSLA is not automatically
equivalent to the scope of the public trust," and, using the language
and legislative history of the GLSLA, concluded that the DEQ's regulatory authority should be determined by the fixed datum natural
ordinary high-water mark. 62 The fixed datum high-water marks
were defined in 1955 and are generally more lakeward than the
63
ordinary high-water mark, as defined in Glass v. Goeckel.

57.

MicH. COMP. LAws ANN.

§ 324.32502

(West 2009) (emphasis added).

58.
See id. (creating the boundary of regulatory authority at the more lakeward, statutolily-defined fixed datum high-water mark); see also Burleson, 808 N.W.2d 792 (deciding the
appropriate interpretation of the GLSLA).
59.

See Burleson, 808 N.W.2d at 796-98.

60.

See id. at 796.

61.

See id.

62.

See id. at 797-98.

63.
SeeJeffrey R. Dobson, Jr. & Nakisha N. Chaney, DEQ Seeks New Beachhead in Shoreline
Development, MICH. B.J. 34, 35, 37 (May 2011) (noting that the DEQ may have overstepped its
authority by attempting to regulate all of the lands held in the public trust rather than only
those lying below the fixed datum high-water mark).
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In interpreting the statute, the Court of Appeals reasoned that
natural ordinary high-water mark" in the GLSLA could not possibly have the meaning suggested by the DEQ because "it strains credulity and common sense to conclude that phrases as similar as
'natural ordinary high-water mark' and 'ordinary high-water
mark' " could have such different meanings when used in the same
paragraph.6 4 The court also expressed concern about giving the
terms "natural ordinary high-water mark" and "ordinary high-water
mark" the same meaning, because such a result would "pose serious
difficulties concerning why the statutory elevations were included
in [the GLSLA] in the first instance. '65 The court buttressed its conclusion by noting that if lawmakers had wanted to give "natural ordinary high-water mark" the meaning advanced by the DEQ they
could have included language that did so explicitly, particularly because the previously enacted Inland Lakes and Streams Act con66
tained just such a definition.
The court's conclusion that the GLSLA directs the DEQ to "preserve and protect the interests of the general public in the lands
and waters described" resulted in a requirement that private landowners must obtain permits for any activities on land below the
fixed datum ordinary high-water mark that could substantially affect the public's right to hunt, fish, swim, or navigate. 67 On the land
above the fixed datum ordinary high-water mark and below the ordinary high-water mark, however, no permits are required. As a result, there is a swath of unregulated public trust land between the
fixed datum high-water mark and the ordinary high-water mark.
Figure 1, below, depicts the resulting public trust management system in Michigan.

64.
See Burleston. 808 N.W.2d at 796.
65.
Id.at 796-97.
66.
See id. at 797 (citing the Inland Lands and Streams Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 324.30101 (m) (West 2009)).
67.
See MicH. CowP. LAws ANN. § 324.32502 (West 2009); Burleson, 808 N.W.2d at
796-98.
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Figure 1. The Public Trust Doctrine in Michigan
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This regulatory gap creates uncertainty about what land falls
within the public trust and who has what rights with respect to that
land. 68 This ambiguity leads to a significant risk of public trust resource overuse and misuse resulting from the incentives created by
ill-defined property rights, which may have serious environmental
69
consequences for the Great Lakes.
A system that promotes resource overuse also amplifies dangers
to public trust resources that arise from private development and
public recreation on littoral lands. For example, private landowners
who want to develop their land may expand structures more quickly
to avoid the possibility of public encroachment, which would lead
to more erosion, sedimentation, and rapid alteration of littoral habitats. 70 In addition, water quality would deteriorate more quickly because the ecosystem would have to cope with significantly more
solid waste. 71 The public may also use public trust resources more
intensely in an unregulated system than in one under which use is
better regulated. Extensive use can result in overfishing and increased sedimentation from swimming and other traffic in areas
close to or below the water line. 72 Michigan's current system thus
threatens resources that provide important and economically valuable ecosystem functions, including water filtration and mainte73
nance of fish habitats.
68.

See infta Part II.A.

69.

See infta Part I1LA-C.

70.
See BRAUNS, supra note 9, at 2 3 ; U.S. ENVrL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 8; FAO Natural
Res. Mgmt. & Env't Dep't, Control of Water Pollution from Agriculture, Chapter 2: Pollution by
Sediments, FooD & AGRC. ORG. OF ME UNITED NATnONS, http://www.fao.org/docrep/
W2598E/w2598e05.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).
71,

See U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 8.

72.

See BRAuNs, supra note 9, at 6, 23; Radomski et al., supra note 9, at 489.

73.

See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 15, at 230-31.
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Michigan's resource management system is not only economically inefficient, but also constitutes an impermissible relinquishment of the State's duty to protect and preserve the land.74 To
create an efficient and lawful public trust resource management system, Michigan must close the regulatory gap and extend the State's
regulatory authority to the ordinary high-water mark, so that it covers and protects all the resources held in the public trust.

B. Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Ohio Have Public Trust
Management Systems that Grant the State Authority to Regulate All of
the Lands and Resources Held in the Public Trust
The permitting systems in Illinois, Wisconsin, Indiana, and Ohio
cover all of the land held in the public trust. 75 These states do not
suffer from the same regulatory gap as Michigan, 76 and are better
able to safeguard the interests of both private landowners and the
public. Failure to protect the public's interest in the area between
the low and high-water marks is the primary deficiency in Michigan's public trust management system. Adopting a system that provides for regulatory authority similar to that of other Great Lakes
states is the most effective way to ensure the preservation of economically valuable ecosystem services held in the public trust. Figure 2 illustrates how the public trust doctrine operates in Illinois,
Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin.

74.
See Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 65 (Mich. 2005). For a discussion of the economic inefficiency of Michigan's public trust management system, see infra Part III.
75.
Compare Brundage v. Knox, 117 N.E. 123, 130-31 (Ill. 1917), with 615 ILL. COMP.
SrAT. § 5/18 (West 2007 & Supp. 2011); compare 312 IND. ADMIN. CODE § 6-1-1 (1941) (indicating that the public trust doctrine extends to the ordinary high-water mark), with IND.
CODE ANN. § 14-26-2-23 (West 2011) (requiring permitting for any activity lakeward of the
shoreline of any public freshwater lake). See also State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dep't of Natural
Resources, 955 N.E.2d 935, 948-49 (Ohio 2011); Waterway & Wetland Permits: Landowners,

Wis.

DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES,

http://dnr.wi.gov/waterways/info-for/landowners.html

(last visited Aug. 30, 2012) (noting that permits are required for almost all activities taking
place below the ordinary high-water mark).
76.
The public trust management system in Minnesota is similar to that in Michigan
because the scope of the public trust doctrine is larger than the scope of the state's
regulatory authority. Compare State v. Korrer, 148 N.W. 617, 623-24 (Minn. 1914), with MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 103G.245 (West 2009). As a result, Minnesota suffers from many of the same
economic and environmental inefficiencies as Michigan. Therefore, much of the discussion
related to Michigan in this Note could also apply to Minnesota.

FALL

2012]

Closing the Regulatory Gap

Figure 2. The Public Trust Management Systems in Other Great
Lakes States
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Michigan is not the only Great lakes state to have faced questions
about the scope of its regulatory authority with respect to the public
trust doctrine. The Ohio Supreme Court recently decided in Merrill
v. Ohio Department of Natural Resources that the State's public trust
doctrine, which is governed by the Fleming Act, extends to the natural shoreline-defined as "the line at which the water usually
stands when free from disturbing causes. ' 77 The Fleming Act gives
Ohio authority to regulate private land use up to the "natural shore
line" and specifies that littoral owners of the upland have no title
beyond the natural shoreline. 78 The Merrill court presumed that,
because the state legislature drafted the Fleming Act to conform to
earlier Ohio Supreme Court precedent that placed the boundary of
the public trust at the natural shore line, the "natural shore line" as
used in the statute must mean "the line at which the water usually
'79
stands when free from disturbing causes.

C. Comparison of the Public Trust Management Systems
in the Great Lakes States
Although the public trust management system in each of the
Great Lakes states varies slightly, all define the boundary of the public trust doctrine at the ordinary high-water mark. The differences
lie in the scope of each state's regulatory authority to protect and
preserve the resources held in the public trust. Illinois, Wisconsin,
Indiana, and Ohio have the power to regulate all of the land held
in the public trust, while Michigan does not. This regulatory gap is
inefficient and will cause significant environmental and economic
consequences for Michigan.
77.
78.
79.

Merrill, 955 N.E.2d at 950.
See OHIo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 1506.10 (LexisNexis 2007).
Merrill, 955 N.E.2d at 950.
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III. MICHIGAN'S PUBLIC TRUST MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ENCOURAGES
RESOURCE OVERUSE AND MISUSE AND WILL BE DETRIMENTAL TO
ECONOMICALLY VALUABLE PUBLIC TRUST RESOURCES

The public trust doctrine is intended to create a system of resource use that maximizes total social benefit to both private landowners and the general public. 0 Unfortunately, a management
system like Michigan's, which leaves important public trust resources unregulated, causes socially inefficient use of resources. As
a result, it is almost certain that a significant portion of the potential social benefit generated by these resources will be lost, significant environmental costs will be incurred, and the purpose of the
public trust doctrine will be frustrated. Past efforts by environmental activists and prior case law show that a normative argument for
reforming the public trust management system is unlikely to succeed."1 Using ecological economics may therefore be a more effective way to convince courts and legislators to improve public trust
resource management and environmental protection. 2
There is significant natural capital and economic value in the
Michigan's presently unregulated public trust resources. 83 Failing to
reform the public trust management system to protect those resources would result in Michigan potentially losing hundreds of
millions of dollars.8 4 Michigan should enact statutory reform to
change its management system and permit regulation of all public
trust lands. This is the best way for the State to avoid significant
economic loss and fulfill its duty to protect and preserve the resources held in the public trust for the use of its citizens.

80.
81.

See Abrams, supra note 17, at 874.
See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 15, at 227-28.

82.
83.

See id. at 230-31.
See JOHN C. AUSTIN

COAST: A BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF A
(2007), available at http://
www.healthylakes.org/site-upload/upload/America_sNorth-Coast Report-07.pdf. Austin's
report discusses future economic benefit available to Great Lakes states if they undertake
Great Lakes restoration efforts. Although his calculations are not of the present day value of
Great Lakes resources, his valuations are still useful for the purposes of this Note. See infra
Part III.D.I.
84.
See LYNN VACCARO ET AL., MICHIGAN'S ECONOMIC VITALI'Y THE BENEFITS OF RESTORING THE GREAT LAKES 5 (2009), available at http://www.miseagrant.umich.edu/downloads/
coastal/economy/09-102-Restoration-Report.pdf. Similar to the Austin report, Vacccaro's report provides helpful calculations for this Note despite the fact that the report primarily
focuses on the economic benefits that might arise from affirmative restoration projects. See
infta Part III.D. 1.
PROGRAM TO PROTECT AND

ET AL., AMERICA'S NORTH

RESTORE THE GREAT LARES 5
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A. Michigan's Public Trust Management System Provides Private
Landowners with Inadequate Incentives to Limit Resource Use
In Michigan, the inconsistent scope of the public trust doctrine
and its associated permitting requirement create uncertainty
among both private littoral landowners and the public. The public
trust management system creates overlapping private and public
ownership between the natural ordinary high-water mark and the
low-water mark.8 5 However, the DEQ only has authority to require
permits for activities that are farther lakeward, below the fixed da86
tum high-water mark established by the GLSLA.
The speed at which public trust resources will deplete is a problem because Michigan has, in essence, created a Rule of Capture
for public trust resources lying between the ordinary high-water
mark and the statutorily defined high-water mark.8 7 Under a Rule
of Capture, the first to effectively take ownership and control of a
given resource gains exclusive rights to that resource.8 The Rule of
Capture creates negative externalities, including resource depletion
and unsustainable or irrational land development.89 For example,
private landowners may act quickly to attempt to gain control over
public trust resources without considering the long-term consequences of developing that land. Such behavior is likely to lead to
rapid environmental degradation. 90
In addition to the race to use resources that is created by the
Rule of Capture, the fact that neither public nor private users have
well-defined or enforceable rights9 1 reduces the value and alienability of this land for private landowners. 92 With alienability hindered,
85.
See Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 69-70 (Mich. 2005).
86.
See MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 324.32502 (West 2009); see also Burleson v. Dep't of
Envtl. Quality, 808 N.W.2d 792, 796-98 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011). The statutorily defined highwater marks were set in 1955 and are consistently more lakeward than the natural ordinary
high-water mark. For a depiction of the space between the bounds of the public trust doctrine and the state's regulatory authority, see Figure 1, supra p. 113.
87.
SeeJohnston, supra note 6 at 890 (noting that unregulated land development essentially follows the Rule of Capture). The Rule of Capture was adopted from English common
law and over time has developed a few related meanings. In this Note, the Rule of Capture is
meant to embody a regime in which a person has a right to unlimited use of whatever natural
resources that person has gained control of. See id. at 856 (explaining the various possible
conceptions of the Rule of Capture).
88.
See id. at 892.
89.
See id. at 891-92.
90.
For a discussion of the environmental effects associated with development, see supra
notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
91.
SeeJaunich, supra note 6, at 183 (discussing the uncertainty that accompanies the
expansion of the public trust doctrine).
92.

See id. at 183-84.
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private landowners have no incentive to preserve resources. 93 Instead, the primary incentive for private landowners is to glean as
much present value from public trust resources as quickly as possible. As a result, private landowners may develop their land quickly,
without worrying about the long-term environmental effects of that
development. These include erosion and destruction of the diverse
shoreline ecosystem, which increase sedimentation 94 and alter fish
populations. 95 Rapid development also diminishes water quality, because more solid waste comes into contact with the water and more
stressors are placed on the ecosystem. 96 The lack of incentive to
conserve resources for later sale or use, combined with the incentive for fast and unsustainable development of public trust lands,
suggest that, under the current regime, unregulated public trust
resources in Michigan will not remain available for use by Michigan
residents in the future.

B. Michigan's Public Trust Management System
Encourages Overuse by the Public
Because the land and resources lying between the statutorily defined high-water mark and the ordinary high-water mark in Michigan are both held in the public trust and remain entirely
unregulated, 9 7 the public has complete and unlimited rights to use
them. Although the public trust doctrine traditionally grants the
public a right of use, that right is not intended to be absolute. 98
With an absolute right to use, the effects of human recreational
activities in the Great Lakes littoral zones are likely to do great
harm to the ecosystem. Access to littoral lands provides access to
fisheries, which have long been overexploited in the Great Lakes. 99
In addition, recreational activity like swimming can resuspend sediments, thereby increasing sedimentation and potentially altering or
10 0
diminishing fish habitats.
93.
See id.
94.
See BRAUNS, supra note 9, at 23.
95.
See Radomski et al., supra note 9, at 489, 494.
96.
See U.S. ENvrrL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 8.
97. See Burleson v. Dep't of Envfl. Quality, 808 N.W.2d 792, 796-98 (Mich. Ct. App.
2011) (limiting DEQ's regulatory authority to the ordinary high-water mark).
98.
See Kevin J. Lynch, Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to Modern Fishery Management
Regimes, 15 N.Y.U. ENv-L. LJ. 285, 300 (2007).
99.
See Impacts on Biodiversity, supra note 12. Fisheries, in this context, mean fishing
grounds or areas where fish are caught.

100.

See Radomski et al., supra note 9, at 489.
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The public's unlimited right to use publicly owned natural resources invokes the Rule of Capture, 0 1 because public users have
an incentive to use as much of the unregulated public land as they
can as quickly as possible with no immediate cost to them or other
members of the public. 0 2 As a result, public users will use the littoral areas more intensely than they otherwise might, and will worsen
the environmental effects from their activities.

C. Overuse and Misuse of Public Trust Resources by Private
Landowners and the Public Will Cause Significant Environmental
Damage to the Great Lakes
This section demonstrates that, because public trust resources
are not appropriately regulated, there is a significant threat to the
health of the Great Lakes, and specifically to Great Lakes fish populations and water quality.

1. Human Activity in the Littoral Zone
Threatens the Great Lakes
Unregulated public trust lands in Michigan fall within the littoral
zone of the Great Lakes, which is particularly important to the
health of the Great Lakes. The littoral zone includes the area between the natural ordinary high-water mark and the portions of the
shoreline that are permanently submerged.0 3 The zone provides
diverse habitats for many aquatic organisms, and its ecological features are important to the overall health and function of the lake
ecosystem. 0 4 The littoral zone is very susceptible to damage from
human development activities on or near beaches.10 5 Several
101. SeeJohnston, supra note 6, at 856.
102. See supra Part IlI.A.
103, See Richard P. O'Neal & Gregory J. Soulliere, Conservation Guidelines for Michigan
Lakes and Associated Natural Resources, 38 FISHEIUEs SPECIAL REP. 5 (2006), available at http://
michiganlakes.msue.msu.edu/uploads/files/139/introduction.pdf
(defining the littoral
zone as the area of a lake beginning where rooted aquatic plants grow and ending at the
point on the shore where the land is unaffected by lake water at the high-water mark).
104. See, e.g., Reuben R. Goforth & Stephanie M. Carman, Nearshore Community Characteristics Related to Shoreline Propertiesin the Great Lakes, 31 J. GREAT LAKES RES. 113, 113-14 (2005);
Scudder D. Mackey & Reuben R. Goforth, Great Lakes Nearshore Habitat Science, 31 J. GREAT
LAKEs REs. 1, 1 (2005); Strayer & Findlay, supra note 104, at 127.
105. See David L. Strayer & Stuart E.G. Findlay, Ecology ofFreshwaterShore Zones, 72 AQUATTC
Sci. 127, 127, 151 (2010) (noting that human use of, and building in, shore zones has reduced the ability of those shore zones to provide necessary ecological services). With respect
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human activities damage littoral zone habitats, including agriculture, air emissions, development, solid waste disposal, and recreation.10 6 With respect to public trust resources, the most important
of those activities are development, solid waste disposal, and recreation. These activities, which are encouraged under Michigan's current public trust management system, will likely have a severe and
concrete impact on several important components of the Great
Lakes ecosystem.

2. Overuse and Misuse of Unregulated Public Trust Resources
Will Harm Fish Populations in Michigan's Great Lakes
Substantial human interference with Michigan's unregulated
public trust resources will reduce substrate stability, and cause a
corresponding negative impact on fish populations.10 7 Development on beaches, including the construction of vacation homes
and docks, can increase erosion, reduce the complexity of the
shoreline ecosystem, and change the composition of substrates.10
Recreational activities along the Great Lakes in Michigan are also
liable to resuspend substrates due to the erosion and other ecosystem changes that often accompany human recreational activities. 0 9
Addition of new substrates and resuspension of previously settled
substrates significantly affects habitat composition and the structure
and production levels of fish communities. 110 The worsening of substrate stability resulting from private and public overuse of unregulated public trust resources significantly reduces shallow water fish
densities. 1 Although larger fish are somewhat more resistant to
changes in substrate stability human activities, they prey on shallow
to the Great Lakes, human development often includes home construction and other alterations to the landscape resulting from frequent human use.
106.

See U.S. ENvrL. PPOT. AGENCY, supra note 8.
107. See Goforth & Carman, supra note 105, at 121-22 (noting that nearshore areas close
to highly developed shorelines are characterized by a decrease in biological and ecological
integrity). Substrates are earthy materials like rocks, sand, or soil that are located along the
lakebed and contribute to habitat heterogeneity. See id. at 113-14 (explaining the effects of
reduced substrate stability in lakebed areas).
108. See BRAUNS, supra note 9, at 23; Radornski et al., supra note 9, at 494; FAO Natural
Res. Mgmt. & Env't Dep't, supra note 70.
109.

See Gofoth & Carman, supra note 105, at 113-14; U.S. EN-vni. PROT. AGENCY, supra

note 8.
110.

See Gofoth & Carman, supra note 105, at 121-22.

111. See id. at 117, 121-22 (noting that substrate stability is highest at "unique" test sites,
which are unaltered near-shore areas).
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water fish that are less resistant, and will therefore also suffer the
12
effects of resource overuse in the long term.'
Michigan's public trust management system also promotes rapid
and unsustainable land use and development that will reduce vegetation cover and harden land on the shoreline, which will affect
Great Lakes fish populations."13 Rapid land use and development
necessarily involves clearing littoral lands and reducing the complexity of the shoreline ecosystem. 14 Fish diversity is correlated with
the diversity of vegetation cover and structure, which is harmed
when humans artificially alter and tidy the shoreline. 1 5 The current
public trust management system creates an unfortunate incentive
for private landowners and the public to engage in construction
and other resource uses that damage the shoreline and alter the
natural vegetation structure, reducing the quality and integrity of
Great Lakes fish populations.

3. Unsustainable Human Activity and Resource Use
in the Littoral Zone Will Lead to Reduced
Great Lakes Water Quality
Overusing and overdeveloping the littoral zone along the Great
Lakes also causes excessive sedimentation and decreased water
quality. Land use changes that arise from human development, particularly home construction, affect the landscape and produce sediments. These sediments, together with other natural factors like
precipitation, drainage, and soil quality, significantly diminish water
quality in the Great Lakes.1 6 Development along the lakeshore also
increases the amount of solid waste deposited in the Great Lakes
watershed, adding contaminants to the water.' 17 These human activities can increase the aging process of lakes and may result in algal
blooms, which reduce water quality.' 1 8 Reduced water quality harms
112.
113.

See id. at 122.
Annet S. Trebitz et al., Geographic, Anthropogenic, and Habitat Influences on Great Lakes

Coastal Wetland Fish Assemblages, 66 CAN. J. FISHERES AND AQUATIC ScI. 1328, 1335 (2009)

(noting that the condition of the immediate shoreline affects fish populations).
114.

See BRAUNS, supra note 9, at 23.

115. SeeTrebitz et al., supra note 113, at 1337; see also BRAUNS, supra note 9, at 23 (noting
that fish compositions are most significantly affected when human development reduces the
complexity of the shoreline); Strayer & Findlay, supra note 104, at 141.
116. See Titus S. Seilheimer et al., ComparativeStudy of Ecological Indices for AssessingHumaninduced Disturbancein Coastal Wetlands of the Laurentian Great Lakes, 9 ECOLOGICAL INDICATORS

81, 81 (2009).
117.

See U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 8.

118.

Detroit River-W. Lake Erie Basin Indicator Project, Indicator:Algal Blooms in Western

Lake Erie, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/med/grosseile-site/indicators/
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the organisms that live in Great Lakes waters. 119 Furthermore, low
water quality negatively affects the health and safety of citizens who
rely on the Great Lakes for drinking water, as well as those who
120
utilize the water for recreational purposes.

D. The Resources Threatened by Michigan's Current Public Trust
Management System Have Significant Economic Value
Using figures developed by other researchers, it is possible to estimate the economic costs that would likely result from Michigan's
current public trust management system.

1. Explanation of the Figures Used in this Note and
Assumptions Necessary for Economic Valuation
Michigan's public trust resources have significant economic
value. As a result, the current management system poses a threat to
2
both the environmental and economic wellbeing of the State.1 '
Recognizing both the value of and threat to these resources, a task
force led by the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
recommended a $26 billion investment in a regional Great Lakes
restoration program that would benefit the entire Great Lakes region.122 Following that recommendation, in 2007, a group of researchers led by John Austin commenced a study to ascertain the
economic benefits that would flow from such an investment, as well
2 3
as the costs of inaction.1
Austin's study provides a useful valuation of the ecosystem services provided by many threatened Great Lakes resources. To the
extent possible, this Note uses Austin's valuations and assumptions
algae-blooms.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2012). Lake aging is a natural process that occurs as a
lake is filled with sediments and other erosional materials. See N.H. DEP'T OF ENVTL. SERVS.,
LAKE EUTROPHICATION 1 (2010), availableat http://des.nh.gov/organization/commissioner/
pip/factsheets/bb/documents/bb-3.pdf.
119. See Trebitz et al., supra note 115, at 1337-38 (discussing the effects of changes in
water clarity and water quality on other factors that relate to the health of an aquatic
ecosystem).
120. See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 83, at 33, 45.
121. See id. at 3-4 (discussing the potential costs of failing to improve resource management of Great Lakes resources and how those compare to the benefits that could arise from
an EPA investment related to Great Lakes resource management).
122. See id.
123. See id. John Austin is a nonresident senior fellow at The Brookings Institute. He
directs the Great Lakes Economic Initiative, which was created to improve the economic
vitality of the Great Lakes region.
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present

value

discounting. 124

Austin's

study, however,

presumes a $26 billion investment in restoration efforts that this
Note does not presume, because there is no indication that those
funds are available or will be available in the future. For the calculations related to fisheries, this Note assumes that no reforms will be

enacted, and that the losses projected by Austin will occur. With
respect to sedimentation and property values, this Note assumes
that, with reform, there will be a modest improvement over the cur1 25
rent situation.
This Note also relies on the work of Lynn Vaccaro and her colleagues in translating Austin's valuations of the benefits and losses

to the entire Great Lakes region into Michigan-specific calculations. 126 Vaccaro's study presumes that because Michigan has 41
percent of the population in the Great Lakes region, it stands to
gain or lose 41 percent of the values calculated by Austin. 127 This

Note assumes that Vaccaro's intuition about the distribution of
gains and losses is accurate and reliable, and therefore uses 41 percent of Austin's calculations as a baseline for all other calculations.

2. Reforming Michigan's Public Trust Management System
Will Help Avoid a 25-50 Percent Reduction in Fish
Populations and an Associated $360 Million-$1.47
Billion Dollar Loss in Economic Value

If Michigan does not adjust its public trust resource management
system, the State risks losing $360 million-$1.47 billion over a period of twenty years resulting from the consequences of decreasing
124. Present value discounting is a calculation used to "reflect the fact that benefits [or
losses] in the future are not worth as much as those received today." AUSTIN ET. AL., stupra
note 83, at 30.
125. These assumptions were selected based on the data available. For example, there is
sufficient baseline data available to predict what will happen to fisheries if the public trust
management system is not reformed. With respect to sedimentation and property values,
however, there is not as much baseline data. Therefore, the only reliable estimates available
are those based on a modest improvement after reform.
126. See VACCARO ET AL., supra note 84. Vaccaro is a project coordinator with Michigan
Sea Grant, which is a program of the University of Michigan and Michigan State University
that supports understanding and stewardship of the Great Lakes.
127. Id. at 4. A population-based approach is reasonable because the reforms proposed in
this Note will affect how Michigan residents use public trust resources. Therefore, the impact
of the reform is likely to be proportional to the number of people it affects. See id. at 4
("[M]ost of the environmental improvements are likely to affect how people use a resource[,] ... and a state with a larger population close to the coast will benefit more.").
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fish populations and diversity and the corresponding losses to fisheries. Human activities on littoral lands that agitate substrates, increase sedimentation, and decrease water quality place significant
pressure on Great Lakes fish and fisheries. t2 8 Absent action to reduce these human activities and bolster Great Lakes fisheries, fish
abundance is projected to decline by 25-50 percent. 129 According
to Austin, there are 23.1 million Great Lakes fishing days each
year. 130 "Fishing days" are calculated by multiplying the number of
days in which the Great Lakes are fished by the number of fishers
(anglers) who fish on each of those days. Anglers value each 1 percent change in fish abundance at $0.15-$0.30 per fishing day,
meaning that the entire Great Lakes region is at risk of losing
$87-$350 million annually. 13 1 Assuming a gradual decline over
twenty years with a discount rate of 6 percent, the overall loss to the
Great Lakes region from fishery decline, if no action is taken, will
be $0.9-$3.5 billion. 32 Michigan's failure to reform its public trust
management system to encourage better resource management
would therefore lead to a fishery decline valued of $360 million-$1.47 billion.1 33
Additional costs would result from the inevitable loss of fisheryrelated jobs that would accompany fishery decline in Michigan. t34
Austin estimates that a 20 percent reduction in fisheries in the
Great Lakes would lead to $200 million in lost wages immediately
and as much as $20-$40 million annually. 135 Michigan's share of
lost wages associated with fishery decline would be $8.2-$16.4 million annually.13 6 If the legislature does not reform the public trust
management system and forestall fishery decline, losses could total
$94-$188 million over twenty years. 137 Equations one through four,
below, show how the projected losses to fisheries and associated
losses to Michigan are calculated.

128.

See supra Part III.C.2.

129.

AUSTIN ET AL.,

130.

Id. at 29.

131.
132.

I.
Id.

supra note 83, at 28.

133. See

VACCARO Er AL., supra note 84, at 6.
Id.; see also AUSTIN ET A ., supra note 83, at 33.
135. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 83, at 33.
136. This number represents 41 percent of the annual losses projected for the Great
Lakes as a whole. This Note assumes that Michigan will experience 41 percent of the economic effects discussed by Austin because Michigan is home to 41 percent of the population

134.

of the Great Lakes states. See VACARRO
137.

See id. at 6.

ET AL.,

supra note 84, at 4.
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Equation 1. Annual Loss to Michigan from
Fishery Decline Without Reform

Annual Loss = (Projected Loss x Daily Value of 1% Change x Number of Fishing Days) x .41 = $36-$144 million

Table 1. Values Used in Equation 1

Projected Decline

Value Per Day of 1
Percent Change in
Fish Abundance

Number of Fishing
Days in Great Lakes
per Year

25-50 percent

$0.15-$0.30

23.1 million

Equation 2. Discounting Loss to Michigan Over 20 Years
20

Total Fishery Loss at Time, t

Net Present Value =

= $360 million -

s'

$1.47 billion

(Ia± Discount Rate)'

Table 2. Values Used in Equation 2

Equation 3. Calculation of Annual Loss to Michigan from
Loss of Fishery-Related Jobs Without Reform
Annual Loss = (Annual Value of Great Lakes' Reduction in Fishery-Related jobs) x .41 =
$8.2 - $16.4 million

Table 3. Values Used in Equation 3
Annual Value of FisheryRelated Jobs in Great Lakes

Estimated Reduction in FisheryRelated Jobs

$100-$200 million

20 percent
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Equation 4. Discounting Loss to Michigan over Twenty Years
20

Net Present Value
=

Total Fishery Loss in Fishery - RelatedJobs at Time, t

t=,I

F

L

(1+ Discount Rate)'

$94 - $188 million

Table 4. Values Used in Equation 4
Total Loss in
Fishery-Related Jobs
at Time, t

Time, t

Discount Rate

$8.2-$16.4 million

1-20 years

6 percent

3. The Reduction in Sedimentation that Would Result from
Reform of the Public Trust Management System Would
Save Michigan $4.2 Million over Twenty Years
An improved public trust management system would reduce sedimentation in the Great Lakes, improving the quality of drinking
water and saving Michigan approximately $4.2 million over a period of twenty years. When sediment levels are high, Great Lakes
water must undergo an extensive and expensive water treatment
process before it is safe to drink. 138 The estimated annual cost of
water treatment for Great Lakes water is $600 million throughout
the region and $246 million in Michigan. 13 9 According to Austin, a
1 percent decrease in sedimentation levels will lead to a 0.05 percent reduction in operations and maintenance costs for water treat140
ment plants.
Though it is difficult to know the degree to which an improved
public trust management system could reduce sedimentation, it
would be more feasible for Michigan to control its lake sedimentation levels if public trust lands were effectively regulated. It is estimated that the proposed restoration plan would decrease sediment
levels by 40 percent.1 4 1 The precise impact of that reform on sediment levels is difficult to ascertain, but a modest 3 percent reduction is not improbable. A 3 percent decrease in sediment levels
138.
139.
cent of
140.
141.

See AuSTIN ET AL., supra note 83, at 33.
See id. at 34; see also supra text accompanying notes 121-122 ($246 million is 41 perAustin's $600 million figure).
AUSTIN ET Al., supra note 83, at 34.
Id.
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would save water treatment plants in Michigan 0.15 percent of their
operation costs-a $369,000 annual savings.1 42 Over twenty years,
Michigan can expect to save about $4.2 million from an improved
public trust management system that helps reduce sedimentation
levels in the Great Lakes. The savings are calculated in Equations
five and six below.

Equation 5. Calculation of Savings for Michigan
Resulting from Reduced Sedimentation
Michigan's Annual Savings = Annual Water Treatment Costs
0.05% Savings
% Reduction in Sedimentation

edtuLL1 o

I n.

JdIIIItaII

.LIl

rn
-

I

Table 5. Values Used in Equation 5

Total Cost of Annual Great
Lakes Water Treatment

Estimated Reduction in
Sedimentation

$600 million

3 percent

Equation 6. Discounting Michigan's Savings over Twenty Years
Net Present Value =

20

-I

Total savings from reduced sedimentation at time, t = $4.2 million
(1 + discount rate)'

Table 6. Values Used in Equation 6

Total Savings
From Reduced
Sedimentation at
Time, t

Time, t

Discount Rate

$369,000

1-20 years

6 percent

142.

See id. at 33.
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4. Reform of the Public Trust Management System Would
Improve Water Clarity and Result in a $590 Million Increase
in Property Values Along the Great Lakes
Reforms of Michigan's public trust management system could increase property values on the Great Lakes by approximately $590
million from the improved water clarity that would result from improved water quality and fewer algal blooms. According to Austin,
with eight million housing units along the Great Lakes, a 1 percent
increase in water clarity along Great Lakes beaches could improve
property values by about $60 per unit.143 Austin expects that the
proposed restoration plan would improve water quality by approximately 25 percent. 144 The calculations in this Note are based on a
much more modest estimated 3 percent increase in water quality,
which would result in an increase in property value along Michigan's Great Lakes of approximately $180 per unit. That property
value increase would amount to more than $590 million in present
value terms. 145 The total property value increase that Michigan is
likely to attain if it reforms its public trust doctrine is calculated in
Equation seven below.

Equation 7. Calculation of Increased Property Value in Michigan
That Would Result From Reform
Increased Property Value in Michigan = (Number of Affected Units)
Value of Improvement x Improvement in Water Quality $590 million
x

1% Improvement

xnt

Table 7. Values Used in Equation 7
Total Number of
Affected Housing
Units in Michigan

Value of
Improvement

Estimated
Improvement in
Water Quality

333 million 146

$60 per unit for
every 1 percent
improvement

3 percent

143. See id. at 36.
144. See id. at 34.
145. See VACARRO ET AL., supra note 84, at 7.
146. Vaccaro estimates a 5 percent increase in property value, or $300 per unit. Id. She
goes on to say that Michigan will gain $1 billion in property value as a result of these reforms.
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5. Michigan Will Be Unable to Capitalize on Significant
Intangible Economic Value if it Does Not Reform its
Public Trust Management System
Adding up the potential losses associated with inaction and the
gains resulting from reform, Michigan's economy has $959
million-$2 billion at stake over a period of twenty years.1 47 However, the value of protecting Michigan's ecosystem services should
not be considered in isolation. The Great Lakes region is suffering
economically, and Michigan is no exception.1 48 Although the Great
Lakes do not themselves create jobs, they can certainly play a role in
boosting economic activity. 1 49 People are substantially more willing
to pay to live in areas of high environmental quality, and workers
enjoy higher real wages in environmentally advantageous areas
than is reflected in the nominal wages they take home.1 50 As a result, the increased economic value of the area would create incentives for increased investment.15 1 Increased investment would serve
as an excellent source of tax revenue for many struggling communities in the Great Lakes region. 152 This so-called "follow-on economic
activity" should not be underestimated, because it will help the
State maximize the economic value of ecosystem services provided
by the Great Lakes.
The economic data presented in this section illustrate the consequences of the resource overuse and misuse encouraged by Michigan's current public trust management system. There are hundreds
of millions of dollars at stake for Michigan's economy if the State
does not reform its public trust management system. The next section proposes specific language for a reform to best meet the needs
of Michigan and its residents.

Id. Given these calculations, Vaccaro is assuming that there are about 3.3 million affected
housing units in Michigan.
147. $360 million in fisheries losses + $4.2 million in extra water treatment costs as
result of sedimentation + $590 million in lost property value due to poor water clarity
$954,200,000; $1.47 billion in fisheries losses + $4.2 million in extra water treatment costs as
result of sedimentation + $599 million in lost property value due to poor water clarity
$2,073,200,000.
148. See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 83, at 12.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 24-25.
151. See id. at 49.
152. See id.

a
=
a
=
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PROPOSED STATUTORY LANGUAGE

Under Michigan's current public trust management regime, the
State is unable to fulfill its duty to protect and preserve resources
held in the public trust. 15 3 The State could potentially lose up to $2
billion in ecosystem services as a result of the resource overuse and
misuse promoted under the current system.' 54 Reforming the public trust management system is necessary to avoid these losses, and
economic arguments will make the state legislature more likely to
155
consider such reforms.
The present regulatory scheme in Michigan is a product of state
courts' interpretations of various provisions of the GLSLA and precedent related to the public trust doctrine. 56 Although reform
could take place either through judicial reconsideration of precedent or through statutory reform, Michigan courts appear reluctant
to reevaluate their interpretation of the GLSLA. 157 In addition, statutory reform may be more expedient, because it would not require
that the right case to arise and make its way through the courts. To
avoid the result produced by Burleson v. Department of Environmental
Quality, where the State was denied regulatory authority over some
public trust resources, the statutory revision must clearly establish
that the scope of the State's regulatory authority with respect to
public trust resources is coextensive with the scope of the public
trust doctrine as defined in Glass v. Goeckel' 58 Expanding State regulatory authority to encompass the entirety of lands held in the public trust would define rights of both private littoral landowners and
the public, and eliminate the incentives for inefficient and wasteful
use of public trust resources.

153. For a discussion of the State's duty to protect public trust resources, see Nedtweg v.
Wallace,208 N.W. 51, 53 (Mich. 1926). See also supra Part I.A. Under the current system, there
are incentives for resource overuse and misuse, leading to rapid resource depletion. See supra
Part III.A-B.
154. See supra Part III.D.
155. See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 15, at 230-32 (explaining the need to reframe the
argument about the public trust doctrine in ecological economic terms).
156. See, e.g., Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 61-62 (Mich. 2005); Burleson v. Dep't of
Envtl. Quality, 808 N.W.2d 792, 792 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (both cases interpreting the
GLSLA and relying on prior case law).
157. See supra note 14.
158. Cf Burleson, 808 N.W.2d at 797 ("[T]he scope of [the DEQ's authority] under the
GLSLA is not automatically equivalent to the scope of the public trust.").
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A. Michigan's Current Statutoy Language Has Several Ambiguities
that Led the Court of Appeals to Limit the DEQ's
Regulatory Authority in Burleson
The current language of the GLSLA provides:
This part shall be construed so as to preserve and protect the
interests of the general public in the lands and waters described in this section, to provide for the sale, lease, exchange,
or other disposition of unpatented lands and the private or
public use of waters over patented and unpatented lands, and
to permit the filling in of patented submerged lands whenever
it is determined by the department that the private or public
use of those lands and waters will not substantially affect the
public use of those lands and waters for hunting, fishing, swimming, pleasure boating, or navigation or that the public trust
in the state will not be impaired by those agreements for use,
sales, lease, or other disposition. The word "land" or "lands" as
used in this part refers to the aforesaid described unpatented
lake bottomlands and unpatented made lands and patented
lands in the [G]reat [L]akes and the bays and harbors of the
great lakes lying below and lakeward of the naturalordinary highwater mark. . . . For purposes of this part, the ordinary high-water
mark shall be at the following elevations above sea level, international
Great Lakes datum of 1955: Lake Superior, 601.5 feet; Lakes Michigan and Huron, 579.8feet; Lake St. Clair,574.7feet; and Lake Erie,
5 71.6 feet.159
One of the most significant problems with the current statute is
that it establishes limits on the DEQ's authority to monitor and regulate the resources held in the public trust without defining the
phrase "natural ordinary high-water mark." As a result, the extent of
the public trust lands subject to the DEQ's regulatory authority is
open to interpretation. 60 The current statute also uses "natural ordinary high-water mark" and "ordinary high-water mark" in close
proximity to one another, which causes confusion for courts trying
to interpret the statute. 16 1 Finally, the current statute suggests that
"the scope of [the DEQ's] regulatory authority under the GLSLA is
not automatically equivalent to the scope of the public trust," which
159.

MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 324.32502 (West 2009) (emphasis added).

160.

See supra Part 11A.

161.

See id,
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is what gave the Court of Appeals latitude to create the existing
162
regulatory gap.

B. The Proposed Revised Statute
The proposed revised statute, below, would eliminate the aspects
of the current law that created the result in Burleson, and would
establish a regime under which the DEQ must regulate all of the
resources held in the public trust. The statute should read as
follows:
Covered Lands
1. The lands and waters covered and affected by this part
are all of those lands and waters covered by the public trust
doctrine.
a. The public trust doctrine applies to all of the unpatented lake bottomlands, unpatented made lands,
and patented lands in the Great Lakes and the bays
and harbors of the Great Lakes lying below and lakeward of the natural ordinary high-water mark.
b. The natural ordinary high-water mark is the mark
where the presence and action of the water is so continuous as to leave a distinct mark either by erosion, destruction of terrestrial vegetation, or other easily
recognized characteristic.
2. This part shall be construed so as to preserve and protect the interests of the general public in the lands and waters described, which are those lands and waters covered by
the public trust doctrine. Pursuant to such purpose, the Department of Environmental Quality shall regulate all of the
lands and waters described. No private littoral landowner
shall sell, lease, exchange, fill in, or construct on the lands
and waters described without first applying for and receiving a permit from the Department of Environmental
Quality.
a. The State shall not issue a permit unless it is determined by the Department that the private or public use
of those lands and waters will not substantially affect
the public use of those lands and waters for hunting,
fishing, swimming, pleasure boating, or navigation or
162. Burleson v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 808 N.W.2d 792, 797-98 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011).
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that the public trust in the state will not be impaired by
such use.
b. The State shall develop guidelines for public use of
the lands and waters described such that the activities
of the public do not substantially affect the public use
of those lands and waters for hunting, fishing, swimming, pleasure boating, or navigation or that the public trust in the state will not be impaired by such use.
In section (1) (b), the revised statute clearly defines the scope of
the public trust doctrine, using the same language as the Michigan
Supreme Court used in Glass v. Goeckel 1 6 - According to the Michigan Court of Appeals, under the current statute "the scope of [the
DEQ's] regulatory authority under the GLSLA is not automatically
equivalent to the scope of the public trust." 64 The revised statute
establishes that State regulatory authority and the scope of the public trust doctrine are equivalent by requiring that the Act be "construed so as to preserve and protect the interests of the general
public in the lands and waters described, which are those lands and
waters included within the public trust doctrine," and that "the Department of Environmental Quality shall regulate all of the lands
and waters described."
The revised statute clarifies the meaning of "the natural ordinary
high-water mark," and eliminates any potential ambiguity by excluding references to the fixed datum high-water mark. By defining
the natural ordinary high-water mark as "the mark where the presence and action of the water is so continuous as to leave a distinct
mark either by erosion, destruction of terrestrial vegetation, or
other easily recognized characteristic," and by eliminating any reference to the fixed datum high-water mark, the revised statute eliminates the statutory text that led to the Court of Appeals'
interpretation in Burleson.165
Finally, the revised statute clarifies and amends the permitting
requirements to better protect the resources held in the public
trust. Under the revised statute, private landowners may not alien1 66
ate or build on public trust land without first seeking a permit
163. Compare supra § 1 (b) of the proposed revised statute, with Glass v. Goeckel, 703
N.W.2d 58, 62 (Mich. 2005).
164. Burleson, 808 N.W.2d at 797.
165. See id.; see also supra Part W.A. Although the revised statute does not precisely incorporate the definition used in the Inland Lakes and Streams Lands Act, it is very similar and is
the exact language used to define the scope of the public trust in Glass v. Goeckel. Compare
MicH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 324.32502 (West 2009), with Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W. 2d at 62.
166. See supra § (2) (a) of the proposed revised statute.
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and the public must follow any guidelines for use promulgated by
the Department of Environmental Quality.16 7 When the DEQ issues
permits and creates guidelines, it must consider the impact on public trust resources and residents' ability to use those resources for
168
traditional purposes such as hunting, fishing, and navigation.
These permitting requirements and public use guidelines will better delineate rights of both private landowners and the public,
which would prevent much of the wasteful resource use that will
occur if the current regulatory regime remains in place.

C. The Proposed Revised Statute Would Eliminate the Incentivesfor
Resource Overuse and Misuse Created Under the Current
Regulatory Scheme
Under the existing regulatory scheme, overuse and degradation
of resources is likely, because ill-defined private and public rights
hinder the alienability of littoral land. 169 Although the permitting
requirements of the revised statute limit alienability by requiring
private landowners who seek to sell, lease, or exchange land held in
the public trust to apply for a permit, they do so in a way that promotes sustainable use of public trust resources.170 Under the proposed revised statute, private landowners who might be encouraged
to use resources wastefully in an attempt to maximize present value
are expressly prohibited from using public trust lands in any way
that would "substantially affect the public use of those lands and
waters for hunting, fishing, swimming, pleasure boating, or
171
navigation."
The regulatory scheme currently in force in Michigan creates a
Rule of Capture. This promotes resource overuse by both private
landowners and the public, because the first to take control of public trust resources has exclusive rights to those resources. 172 As revised, the statute eliminates this system by establishing a means of
control for all public trust resources and creating prerequisites for
use and ownership of those resources. 73 Eliminating the Rule of
167. See id. § (2)(c).
168.

See id. § (2)(b)-(c).

169.

See supra Part i11.A-B.

170.

See supra § 2 of the proposed revised statute.

171.

See id. § (2)(b).

172.

See supra Part III.A.

173.

See supra § 2 of the proposed revised statute,
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Capture would encourage more sustainable use of these resources,
174
helping ensure their existence for future generations.

CONCLUSION

The existing public trust management system in Michigan creates a regulatory gap between the scope of the public trust doctrine
and the extent of the State's regulatory authority. As a result, the
rights of both private landowners and the public to use public trust
lands and resources are uncertain and ill-defined. This uncertainty
creates an incentive to overuse and misuse those resources, which
has a significant environmental impact on the Great Lakes in Michigan. This is a problem not just because the environmental resources along the Great Lakes have intrinsic and normative value,
but also because they have great economic value. If Michigan does
not reform its public trust management system, the State stands to
lose up to $2 billion over twenty years as a result of environmental
damage to unregulated public trust lands.
The most effective way to bring about such reform of the public
trust management system is to present economic arguments to the
state legislature and create a revised statute to govern both the public trust doctrine and the State's regulatory authority over the lands
and resources held in the public trust. That statute must eliminate
any ambiguity regarding the bounds of the public trust doctrine
and unequivocally establish that the State's regulatory authority is
equivalent to the scope of the public trust doctrine. Under the revised statute, the State would be able to effectively regulate all lands
and resources held in the public trust, which would reduce environmental damage and help save Michigan from significant economic
losses.

174.

See supra Part III.A.

